Jemaah Islamiyah’s disbandment appears irreversible – and real

At an event orchestrated by Indonesia’s counter-terrorism agency (BNPT) in late June, Abu Rusydan and 15 other senior Jemaah Islamiyah members read out a statement announcing that their militant group was disbanding. 

Many people, including victims of Jemaah Islamiyah’s past terrorist acts – foremost among them, the 2002 Bali bombings – reacted with suspicion.  

Abu Rusydan, Para Wijayanto, and JI military chief Khoirul Anam are all currently imprisoned, leading some to speculate whether this decision was coerced or done in the hopes of having their sentences reduced.

Yet, evidence gathered in the months that followed suggests this decision was both real and irreversible. There are six reasons for this.

First, although institutionally resilient, Jemaah Islamiyah had been militarily dormant since 2011 and weakened by arrests, including the December 2020 takedown of Zulkarnaen (also known as Aris Sumarsono), their head of military operations. His arrest decimated what was left of JI’s training apparatus.

The government legally banned JI in 2008, but gave the group space to involve itself in education, charitable work, businesses and other activities, as long as it refrained from violence. 

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Following Para Wijayanto’s 2019 arrest, attitudes towards Jemaah Islamiyah hardened among Indonesian security forces. They saw a well-resourced JI poised to resume violence after a tactical lull. 

That year, only 8% of total terrorism arrests were of JI members. As many JI suspects were arrested in 2021 and 2022 as were suspected members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah. In 2023, suspected JI members accounted for 53% of terrorism arrests, including several next generation leaders, Wijayanto’s son amongst them.

There was a political rationale as well. There are over 1,000 sharia codes throughout the country. Violence has achieved nothing towards implementing Islamic law, compared to democratic politics.

Second, this was a deliberative process that was years in the making.

Wijayanto approached Densus 88 following his 2019 arrest and requested a meeting with Abu Rusydan, a former emir of the group who was at large, but the police wouldn’t commit to not arresting him. Wijayanto had already penned a 500-page tract explaining his 42 reasons for disbanding the group. 

Even after Rusydan’s arrest in 2021, it still took nearly three years for the police to organize the meeting. 

But this past March, both men concluded that violent jihad was unnecessary because Muslims in Indonesia were not under attack, and the state itself was not holding back the establishment of the sharia. This built on a 2016 ruling by JI’s Fatwah Council that the national ideology, Pancasila, was not anti-Islamic in nature. 

The two leaders then requested a meeting with Khoirul Anam, who was also incarcerated, and Bambang Sukirno, a party elder and disciple of JI’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar.

A video of that May meeting, with their decision to disband based on Rusydan’s “Conclusion 642” theory, was then shared by Sukirno, who was not incarcerated, with other senior JI members. 

In a separate video, Koirul Anam announced that JI would immediately end “tanzim siri” (clandestine organization) and “tanzim askary” (military organization).

That resulted in a gathering of the JI leadership in Solo, on June 29, with party elders and representatives of each of the 42 madrassas controlled by JI. The official disbandment announcement went forward the following day. 

Third, while deliberations unfolded, Abu Fatih started to build up trust by turning in weapons and explosive stocks, as a show of good faith.

Fatih admitted that not all weapons had been turned in or located – unsurprising given the geographic spread of the organization and its cellular structure. A spokesman for Densus 88 acknowledged that while the process was still ongoing, “The guns and explosives that they kept, including other materials that still reflect the strength of JI, were handed over.”

Fourth, as of mid-November, many of the 5,500-6,000 members had attended one of the 42 ceremonies, where they pledged their allegiance to the “Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.” 

The size of the ceremonies has varied depending on the region, focusing on JI’s strongholds. The Java ceremonies have been the largest: Bekasi (400), Kudus (280), Semarang (230), Banyumas Raya (300), Karesidenan Pekalongan (152), Madiun (150), and in Depok. 

These ceremonies have been held across the archipelago, including in Central and South Sulawesi, Balikpapan, Palembang, Riau, the Malukus, and elsewhere in Sumatra. 

Almost all of these ceremonies have been attended by several of the 16 senior JI leaders, including Sukirino, Wijayanto, Abu Fatih, Abu Rusydan, Khoirul Anam, Zarkasih, Ustad Hasan Partono, and witnessed by Ustad Imtihan Syafi’i, the former chairman of the JI Fatwa Council and one of JI’s top Islamic law scholars.

While not everyone is on board, there’s hope that more will be brought in as the decision and its justifications are disseminated more broadly.

Fifth, there has been some initial progress in instituting curriculum reform at JI’s 42 madrassas and boarding schools.

This will be the hardest piece, and will involve the constant supervision of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Religion, as well as the BNPT and Densus 88.

The rejection of takfiri ideology and an acceptance of Islamic pluralism will be key to this. 

As important as curriculum reform, will be the commitment of the school leadership and the teachers, because the real radicalization and recruitment took place in after-school sessions. 

To date, the government has reported no pushback in their talks with the school leaders about curriculum reform.

Sixth, Wijayanto opened up a channel to JI members still in Syria, who joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a militant group tied to al-Qaeda, to both share the announcement and to work with Densus 88 to bring them home.

While not taking away from these positive developments there are reasons for continued concern.

While JI leaders have apologized to victims and acknowledged that they went down the wrong path, the denouncement of violence has not been robust enough.

One thing that is noticeable from the videos and photographs of the 42 ceremonies is just how old the members are. As such, many younger militants who are committed to using violence to achieve their political aims are likely to defect to other groups.

With JAD decimated and leaderless, security forces have recently been focusing on Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), including making two more arrests in November 2024.

We also don’t know the stance of prominent JI members who’ve recently been arrested or are currently on trial, including Farid Okbah, Fitria Sanjaya, Anung Al-Hamat, and Ahmad Zain An-Naja.

But for now, the onus is on the state to better fund their disengagement programs and work with NGOs and other state actors to secure livelihoods.

Thousands of former JI members have pledged allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, and its “unity in diversity.” Now, the question is, can the state deliver?

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or BenarNews.